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XENOPHOBIA AND RADICALISM IN RUSSIA, 2020-2022

1. Legislation.

On 27 April 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law amending the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation. The Criminal Code was supplemented with Article 243.4 (destruction or damage to military burial grounds, as well as monuments, steles, obelisks, other memorial structures or objects commemorating those who died in defence of the Fatherland or its interests or dedicated to the days of military glory of Russia). According to part 1 of this article, for such actions committed "in order to cause damage to the historical and cultural significance of such objects", the punishment was a fine of up to 3 million rubles or wages for a period of up to three years, or forced labour for up to three years, or imprisonment for the same period. Moreover, it referred to facilities located both in Russia and abroad. Part 2 of the new norm covered the same actions committed by a group of persons, a group of persons by prior conspiracy or an organised group; or committed with the use or threat of violence; or committed against objects "dedicated to persons who defended the Fatherland or its interests during the Great Patriotic War". The penalties included a fine of 2 to 5 million roubles or in the amount of wages for a period of one to five years, compulsory labour for up to 480 hours, compulsory labour for up to five years, or imprisonment for the same period¹.

On 23 May 2020, the law "On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation (in terms of improving legislation on elections and referendums and ensuring basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right to participate in a referendum of citizens of the Russian Federation)" was adopted, prohibiting those convicted under "extremist" and "terrorist" articles of the Criminal Code from being able to be elected to representative bodies of municipalities and legislative bodies for five years after their convictions have been expunged or expunged². The problem is that due to the use of some articles of the Criminal Code to fight oppositionists, these restrictions are perceived as an attempt to restrict the ability of opposition candidates to be elected in yet another way.

On 29 May 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new version of the Strategy for Countering Extremism until 2025. The Strategy introduced the concept of "ideology of violence", defined as a set of views and ideas that justify the use of violence to achieve political, ideological religious and other goals.

The definition of "manifestations of extremism" was extended to include acts that threaten the constitutional order and violate the territorial integrity of Russia. The definition of "countering extremism" also includes activities to minimise and eliminate the consequences of extremism.

The new version of the Strategy provides a new description of external and internal extremist threats. External threats are now considered to be "support and encouragement by a number of states of destructive activities carried out by foreign or international non-governmental organisations aimed at destabilising the socio-political and socio-economic situation in the Russian Federation, violating the

¹<https://www.mskagency.ru/materials/2991367>

²http://www.rapsinews.ru/legislation_news/20200520/305822382.html

unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, including instigating "colour revolutions", destroying traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, as well as facilitating the activities of international extremist organisations.

The Strategy defines internal threats as attempts by nationalist, radical public, religious, ethnic and other organisations and individuals to carry out extremist activities, the spread of violent ideology, the inducement, recruitment or other involvement of Russian citizens and foreigners in the country in extremist communities and other illegal activities, as well as the formation of closed ethnic and religious enclaves, as well as historical and socio-ecological threats, and the formation of closed ethnic and religious enclaves.

As a potential source of threats, the new Strategy mentions hotbeds of terrorism in the Middle East, the creation of clandestine cells of extremist and terrorist organizations (including through remote recruitment), the danger of radicalization of migrant workers, and the "information and psychological influence" of foreign intelligence services to "erode traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and destabilize the domestic political and social situation in the country" through the "destructive activities" of NGOs "under the guise of humanitarian aid, Sports schools and clubs are also mentioned as hotbeds of radicalisation of young people.

The directions of the state policy of countering extremism include "improving mechanisms for countering destructive activities of foreign or international non-governmental organisations", combating "instigation of "colour revolutions", preventing any form of discrimination and creating an atmosphere of intolerance to xenophobia in society. In the area of migration policy it is proposed to develop adaptation programmes for migrants; to counteract the emergence of spatial segregation, the formation of ethnic enclaves and the social exclusion of certain groups of citizens; to involve civil society institutions and fully inform society about migration processes and to counteract false information causing hatred and hostility about them;

According to the new version of the Strategy, the educational process should form in children "an all-Russian civic identity, patriotism, civic responsibility, a sense of pride in the history of Russia," as well as foster a culture of interethnic and interreligious communication. The Strategy included a list of areas of anti-extremism policy related to civil society: state support for civil society institutions fighting extremism, including veteran and youth organisations, work with socially oriented NGOs, participation of public councils in activities to harmonise inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, and assistance to the media "in broad and objective coverage" of the activities of entities involved in countering extremism.

Unlike the previous version, the new version of the Strategy introduces target indicators: the dynamics of the number of registered crimes, administrative offences and identified perpetrators by year; the share of violent crimes in the total number of extremist crimes by year; the number of public, religious associations and organisations recognised as extremist; the number of Internet resources with extremist materials that were blocked and from which these materials were removed. ³The expected results of the Strategy's implementation include: a reduction in the number of extremist threats in the Russian Federation; a reduction in the share of violent crimes in the total number of extremist crimes; prevention of the dissemination of extremist materials in the media and on the Internet; an increase

³<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202005290036?index=0&rangeSize=1>

in the level of interaction between entities involved in countering extremism; active participation of civil society institutions in the prevention and avoidance of extremist manifestations; the formation of an atmosphere in society, especially among young people; and the development of a culture of "extremism".

On 31 July 2020, amendments to the law "On Countering Extremist Activity" were adopted. According to them, the wording "violent change of the foundations of the constitutional order and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation" included in the definition of extremism is replaced by "violent change of the foundations of the constitutional order and (or) violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation (including alienation of part of the territory of the Russian Federation) with the exception of delimitation, demarcation, redemarcation of the state border of the Russian Federation with neighbouring states"⁴.

On 8 December 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed laws amending the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) and the Criminal Code (CC) of the Russian Federation, which relate to liability for separatism and calls for it. According to the law, article 280.1 of the Criminal Code (public calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation) is supplemented by the mechanism of administrative prejudice: for the first offence within one year, liability will follow under the new article of the CAO 20.3.2 with the same name. Ч. 1 will provide for a fine of 30 to 60 thousand rubles for citizens, from 60 to 100 thousand rubles for officials and from 200 to 300 thousand rubles for legal entities. Part 2 of Article 20.3.2 punishes for actions committed with the use of mass media or the Internet with a fine of 70 to 100 thousand rubles for citizens, 100 to 200 thousand rubles for officials and 300 to 500 thousand rubles for legal entities. At the same time, the fine under Part 1 of Article 280.1 was raised from 100 to 300 thousand rubles to 200 to 400 thousand rubles (now it is 100 to 300 thousand rubles).

In addition, the Criminal Code introduced Article 280.2 (violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation), which punishes "alienation of a part of the territory of the Russian Federation or other actions (except for delimitation, demarcation, redemarcation of the state border of the Russian Federation with neighbouring states) aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation" with imprisonment for a term of six to ten years⁵.

On 5 April 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill amending the federal law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations". It stipulated that the leader and participant of a religious group may not be a foreign citizen or stateless person in respect of whom a decision has been made that his or her stay in the Russian Federation is undesirable, a person included in the list of extremists and terrorists of Rosfinmonitoring, a person in respect of whom a court decision that has entered into legal force has established that his or her actions contain signs of extremist activity, or an individual whose accounts have been frozen by the Interdepartmental Commission for Countering the Financing of Terrorism. It was also said that clergymen and religious personnel of religious organisations who have completed training programmes for clergymen or religious personnel in foreign educational organisations and who, for the first time, begin to perform divine

⁴<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202007310069?index=1&rangeSize=1>

⁵<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202012080068?index=0&rangeSize=1>,
<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202012080078?index=0&rangeSize=1>

services, rituals, missionary work or teaching activities in Russia, "receive additional professional education in the area of the basics of state-confessional relations in the Russian Federation"⁶ .

⁷On 5 April 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed amendments to the federal law "On Education" that prohibit "the use of educational activities to incite social, racial, national or religious discord, for agitation promoting exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens on the basis of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation, their attitude to religion, including through the reporting of false information about historical, national, religious and cultural backgrounds, as well as the use of false information about the national, religious and cultural identity of citizens.

On the same day, he signed a package of amendments to strengthen responsibility for the rehabilitation of Nazism. According to them, the fine under Part 1 of Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code increased to three million rubles (from 300000 rubles), Part 2 - from 500000 to 5 million or wages for a period of one to five years. 2 - from 500000 to 5 million rubles or salary for a period of one to five years.

In part 3 of Art. 3 of Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code introduced a new offence of insulting the memory of defenders of the Fatherland and humiliating the honour and dignity of veterans of the Great Patriotic War. For this, liability is established in the form of a fine of up to three million or a salary for a period of up to three years, or compulsory labour for up to 360 hours, or correctional labour for up to one year, or compulsory labour, or imprisonment for up to three years with a ban on certain activities for up to three years, and for a similar offence committed by a group of persons or in the media and the Internet, a penalty is introduced in the form of a fine of two to five million or a salary for a period of one to five years, or compulsory labour for up to five years,

Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offences (abuse of freedom of mass information) was supplemented with para. ⁸4.1, according to which "Public dissemination of information denying the facts established by the verdict of the International Military Tribunal for the trial and punishment of the main war criminals of the European Axis countries, or approving the crimes established by the said verdict, as well as public dissemination of knowingly false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War and about veterans of the Great Patriotic War, including those committed with the use of mass media and (or) information and telecommunications networks (including, inter alia, information and telecommunication networks), as well as public dissemination of knowingly false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War and about veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

On 4 June 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law banning persons involved in the activities of an extremist or terrorist organisation from being elected to government bodies. Involvement means direct implementation of the goals and/or forms of activity (including individual events), in connection with which the relevant organisation has been recognised as extremist or terrorist, expressing "support through statements" for such goals and forms of activity, as well as for the organisations themselves, providing financial, property, organisational, methodological, advisory and other assistance to banned organisations.

⁶<https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/992354-7>

⁷<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202104050036>

⁸<https://rg.ru/2021/04/05/putin-podpisal-zakony-o-lishenii-svobody-do-5-let-za-oskorblenie-veteranov.html>

Involvement must be established "by an effective court judgement"⁹ .

On 28 June 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law introducing amendments to Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO), and on 1 July, amendments to Article 4 of the Law on Mass Media.

According to them, the absence of mentioning that an organisation is recognised as a terrorist organisation will be punishable by fines: 2000-2500 for citizens, 4000-5000 for officials, for legal entities - from forty to fifty thousand rubles¹⁰ .

On 1 July 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law amending the federal laws "On Commemorating the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" and "On Countering Extremist Activity". According to them, the definition of extremist materials includes "*speeches, images of leaders of groups, organisations or movements recognised as criminal in accordance with the verdict <...> of the Nuremberg Tribunal*" and "*speeches, images of leaders of organisations that collaborated with the said groups, organisations or movements*", *and* also introduces a ban on the demonstration of images of Nazis and collaborators recognised as extremist materials¹¹ .

On 2 July 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving a new National Security Strategy. It notes that "against the backdrop of the crisis of the Western liberal model" some states are attempting to "purposefully erode traditional values, distort world history, revise views on Russia's role and place in it, rehabilitate fascism, and incite inter-ethnic and inter-confessional conflicts".¹² Measures to ensure state and public security in the Strategy include "prevention and suppression of terrorist and extremist activities", "prevention of manifestations of radicalism, prevention of extremist and other criminal manifestations, primarily among minors and young people", "prevention and neutralisation of social, inter-confessional and inter-ethnic conflicts, separatist manifestations, prevention of the spread of religious radicalism, destructive religious movements, formation of ethnocentrism and the formation of ethnic groups", and "prevention of the spread of religious radicalism and destructive religious movements".

On 20 December 2021, an action plan was approved for the implementation in 2022-2025 of the Strategy for State National Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025. It provides for annual "Monitoring of citizens' appeals on the facts of violation of the principle of equality of citizens regardless of race, nationality, language, attitude to religion, beliefs, membership of public associations, as well as other circumstances, including in hiring, filling positions in the formation of the personnel reserve at the federal and regional levels" and monitoring of publications in the media about these violations. The Federal Agency for Nationalities of the Russian Federation (FADN) and the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Russian Federation, with the participation of federal and regional executive authorities, have been appointed as the monitors.

⁹<https://pravo.ru/news/232252/>

¹⁰<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107010064?index=0&rangeSize=1><http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202106280033>

¹¹<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107010019?index=0&rangeSize=12>

¹²<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107030001>

Another monitoring - "Monitoring of the activities of public associations, religious and other non-profit organisations, exchange of information on the detection of manifestations of extremism on ethnic and religious grounds by these associations, including possible attempts to disseminate extremist ideology and literature" - should be conducted by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General's Office¹³ .

¹⁴On 30 December 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law amending Article 15.3 of the federal law "On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection", according to which information containing "calls for mass disorder and extremist activity, justification and (or) justification of extremist activity, including terrorist activity", as well as information materials of organisations that are not members of the Russian Federation, will be subject to extrajudicial blocking of materials on the Internet at the request of the Prosecutor General's Office.

On 14 July 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law providing for changes in legislation in the area of state security. The law introduces a new Article 282.4 into the Criminal Code (repeated propaganda or public demonstration of Nazi attributes or symbols, or attributes or symbols of extremist organisations, or other attributes or symbols, the propaganda or public demonstration of which is prohibited by federal laws). According to part 1, propaganda or public display of Nazi or similar paraphernalia and symbols, as well as the paraphernalia and symbols of extremist organisations or other paraphernalia or symbols, the propaganda or display of which is prohibited by federal law, is punishable by a fine of 600,000 to one million roubles or in the amount of income for a period of two to three years, compulsory labour for up to 480 hours, correctional labour for a period of one to two years, compulsory labour for a period of up to four years, or deprivation of liberty for the same period.

Ч. 2 punishes the manufacture or sale for propaganda purposes or acquisition for the purpose of sale or propaganda of all the above attributes or symbols with a fine of 600 thousand to one million roubles or in the amount of income for a period of two to three years, compulsory labour for a term of up to 480 hours, correctional labour for a term of one to two years, compulsory labour for a term of up to four years, or deprivation of liberty for the same term¹⁵ .

On 14 July 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law "On Amendments to Article 265-10 of the Code of Administrative Procedure of the Russian Federation and Articles 13 and 15 of the Federal Law 'On Countering Extremist Activity'", according to which a "unified databank of extremist materials"¹⁶ .

On 19 December 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the law "On Amendments to the Air Code of the Russian Federation", which provides for a ban on hiring people included in the

¹³<https://irp.news/gosudarstvo-v-rf-nachinaet-totalnyj-monitoring-religioznyh-del/>

¹⁴<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202112300008?index=0&rangeSize=1>

¹⁵<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202207140023?index=0&rangeSize=1>

¹⁶<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202207140065?index=2&rangeSize=1>

Rosfinmonitoring list - a list of persons in respect of whom there is information about their involvement in extremist and terrorist activities¹⁷ .

Migration legislation

In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and border closures, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree on 15 April 2020 allowing foreigners to retain their legal status even if the legal terms of their residence in the country and the documents granting this right had expired. Their registrations, patents, residence permits and other documents were not cancelled, nor were foreigners expelled or deported. The President extended the decree three times: until 15 September, until 15 December and until 15 June 2021¹⁸ .

On 8 June 2020, amendments were adopted to the law "On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation", which expanded the list of foreigners who can act as the inviting party when accepting a migrant - previously it was qualified specialists, and now - any people who own residential premises and are willing to provide it to a migrant for housing, allowing registration and deregistration through MFCs (multifunctional centres of state services) or through the portal "Gosudservices"¹⁹ .

The National Security Strategy adopted in July 2021 noted the need to "counter illegal migration, strengthen control over migration flows, social and cultural adaptation and integration of migrants"²⁰ . Federal Law No. 357-FZ of 14 July 2022 introduced a number of amendments to the laws "On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation", "On the Procedure for Departure from and Entry into the Russian Federation", "On State Dactiloscopic Registration in the Russian Federation", "On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation", "On Compulsory Medical Insurance in the Russian Federation" and "On the Unified Federal Information Register Containing Information on the Population of the Russian Federation". The concept of "temporary residence permits for the purpose of education" was introduced, detailing how the stay of such people is formalised and ends. In addition, the period of temporary stay in the Russian Federation of children under the age of eighteen of a foreign citizen who have not reached the age of eighteen and are engaged in labour activity on the basis of a patent was extended for the period of validity of the patent issued (extended, re-issued) to this foreign citizen.

The terms of compulsory fingerprinting of various categories of newcomers were clarified: foreign citizens arriving for purposes not related to labour activity for a period exceeding ninety calendar days - within ninety calendar days from the date of entry into the Russian Federation, foreign citizens arriving in the Russian Federation for labour activity - within thirty calendar days from the date of entry into the Russian Federation, foreign citizens having the right to carry out labour activity in the

¹⁷<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202212190041?index=0&rangeSize=1>

¹⁸<https://xn-b1aew.xn--p1ai/news/item/21275006/>, <https://migranturus.com/za-patent-mozhno-ne-platit-registraciju-ne-prodlevat-rabotat-bez-trudovyh-dokumentov-putin-podpisal-ukaz-dlja-migrantov-na-period-ogranichenij-iz-za-koronavirusa/>, <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/741724>

¹⁹<https://rg.ru/2020/06/11/inostranzi-dok.html>

²⁰<http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107030001>

Russian Federation - within thirty calendar days from the date of entry into the Russian Federation, foreign citizens having the right to carry out labour activity in the Russian Federation - within thirty calendar days from the date of entry into the Russian Federation, foreign citizens having the right to carry out labour activity in the Russian Federation - within thirty calendar days from the date of entry into the Russian Federation, foreign citizens having the right to carry out labour activity in the Russian Federation - within thirty calendar days from the date of entry into the Russian Federation. Clarifications have also been introduced on the issuance of patents²¹ .

The law on "banning propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors", which came into force on 2 July 2013, supplemented the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation with Article 6.21, establishing administrative liability for "propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors", and also amended the federal law "On Protection of Children from Information Harmful to their Health and Development", adding "information" to the list of information prohibited for dissemination among children.

The article established a fine of 4 to 5 thousand rubles for individuals and 40 to 50 thousand rubles for officials, 800 thousand to 1 million rubles, or administrative suspension of activities for up to 90 days for legal entities. If such propaganda was made using mass media (including the Internet), the fine for individuals increased to amounts from 50 to 100 thousand rubles, for officials - from 100 to 200 thousand rubles, for legal entities - up to 1 million rubles or administrative suspension of activities for up to 90 days. The ECHR in 2017 recognised it as discriminatory²² .

On 5 December 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the law "On Amending the Federal Law 'On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information' and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation", which prohibits the dissemination on the territory of the Russian Federation of information promoting non-traditional sexual relations and (or) preferences, paedophilia, sex change without distinction of age²³ . A fine from 50,000 to 400,000 roubles for citizens, from 100,000 to 800,000 for officials, from 800,000 to 50,000,000 or suspension of activities for up to 90 days for legal entities.

The law on missionary activity (Federal Law No. 374 of 06.07.2016 "On Amending the Federal Law "On Countering Terrorism" and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Part of Establishing Additional Measures to Counter Terrorism and Ensure Public Safety", which introduced Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences) imposes a number of restrictions on the activities of religious organisations: it establishes a closed list of places where missionary activity is allowed, and also introduces a ban on missionary activity in residential premises (except for holding religious services). Restrictions are imposed on the participation of foreigners who entered Russia at the invitation of a religious organisation in missionary activities on behalf of other religious organisations²⁴ . While there is no clear concept of "missionary activity" in the law, even believers who tell their neighbours about their religion could theoretically be held liable under the law.

²¹ <https://rg.ru/documents/2022/07/22/document-inostranci.html>

²² <https://www.arsvest.ru/rubr/2/42393>

²³ <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/48626>

²⁴ [http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/\(SpravkaNew\)?OpenAgent&RN=1039149-6&02](http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(SpravkaNew)?OpenAgent&RN=1039149-6&02)

On 5 October 2021, the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) published a report on Russia's implementation of two priority recommendations made by the Commission in March 2019 following the fifth cycle of monitoring of the situation in Russia. Russia refused to implement the recommendation to establish a body independent from the police and prosecutor's office authorised to investigate complaints of police misconduct, in particular racial profiling, as well as the recommendation to repeal the law on propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors²⁵.

2. Law enforcement practices affecting minorities.

One can note the active use of anti-xenophobic rhetoric by high-ranking officials.

On 3 March 2021, at an enlarged meeting of the board of the Russian Interior Ministry, Russian President Vladimir Putin called on law enforcement officers to suppress propaganda of nationalism, xenophobia, religious enmity and violence. "The most serious attention should be paid to the fight against extremism. I ask to strictly suppress propaganda of nationalism, xenophobia, religious enmity and violence, to bring to justice provocateurs who run away, hide, and if they are caught by the hand - repent, and people are pushed on the path of offences," - said the President²⁶.

On 17 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking at a board meeting of the Interior Ministry, pointed out that the number of extremist crimes in Russia had increased by a quarter over the past year.

He called for the involvement of civil society and the media in the fight against extremist crimes and noted that special attention should be paid to neutralising attempts by extremists and radicals of various kinds to use the Internet.

The head of state said that the effective fight against extremism is directly linked to the solution of tasks in the migration sphere. "...Any manifestations of extremism, violations of law and order, illegal labour activity" should be "the basis for rapid adoption and execution of decisions to expel illegal migrants from Russia and to ban them from entering our country in the future," the president said²⁷.

On 3 December 2020, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev stated at a meeting with members of the government, heads of security departments, services and agencies that the effectiveness of work to combat extremism needs to be further strengthened and extremists should not have a "public ideological basis"²⁸.

On 30 June 2021 in Moscow, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev said at a meeting on the crime situation in the Russian Federation: "In the conditions of the pandemic, acts of extremism also remain a significant threat. The increase in registered offences of this kind in

²⁵<https://rm.coe.int/rf-ifu-v-2021-27-fre/1680a401de>

²⁶<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65090>

²⁷<http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67795>

²⁸<https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3132210.html>

the first five months of this year is quite significant - almost 45%", and called for "further resolute fight against propaganda of nationalism, xenophobia and violence"²⁹ .

The sawing off of a cross in the village of Aktanysh in the Aktanyshsky district of Tatarstan provoked a harsh reaction from the Tatarstan authorities. In December 2021, the President of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov issued a stern warning to the head of the district Engel Fattakhov and instructed him to ensure that all work on the restoration of the grave takes into account the wishes of the family of the deceased. On 27 December 2021, Mufti of Tatarstan Kamil Samigullin instructed local imams to remind parishioners of the need to respect the rights of believers during burial, regardless of their religion. In June 2022, Rustam Minnikhanov criticised miscreants who cut down a cross at a cemetery in Aktanysh. Minnikhanov noted that law enforcement agencies should promptly identify those responsible for desecration of a grave in the Aktanysh cemetery. He called such actions unacceptable "in our society" and the incident in Aktanysh "not peculiar" to Tatarstan. "The perpetrators must necessarily be identified and bear full responsibility for their actions," the head of the Republic of Tatarstan said. He instructed the heads of municipalities to pay close attention to the issue of preserving graves and not to allow such cases³⁰ . Deputy head of the district administration Raihan Galimyanova in December 2021 and E. Fattakhov himself in June 2022 resigned³¹ .

Problems of law enforcement

One of the main problems in the enforcement of anti-extremist legislation is the broad wording and, as a result, the delegation by the legislator of the interpretation of laws to law enforcers, which leads to abuses. Sometimes the situation is critical on the ground, which requires appropriate clarifications from the federal executive and judicial authorities.

For example, on 6 October 2021, Rossiyskaya Gazeta published official clarifications by the Russian Ministry of Justice on the application of the law banning the display of images of Nazi and collaborationist leaders. According to them, the distribution or public display (including in books and audiovisual works) of materials with speeches and portraits of leaders of Nazi and collaborationist structures should not be considered extremist activity if these materials do not call for extremist activity, do not justify or justify the need to carry out extremist activity, do not justify or justify national and (or) racial superiority, do not justify the practice of coercion, and do not justify the practice of extremism. ³²"Thus, scientific, cultural, educational and bookselling activities **are not** extremist activities and, accordingly, works of science, literature, art, mass media products, feature and documentary films (including chronicles), educational, scientific, popular science publications, images (illustrations and photographs) in these publications, at exhibitions, in libraries, museums and in databases of the information and telecommunications network "Internet", etc., educational materials are not considered extremist materials.

²⁹https://tass.ru/obschestvo/11789271?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D

³⁰<https://inkazan.ru/news/2022-06-10/nedopustimo-minnikhanov-potreboval-nayti-spilivshih-krest-na-mogile-1405584>

³¹<https://ria.ru/20211217/vandalizm-1764311887.html>, <https://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=78327#>, <https://aktanysh.tatarstan.ru/index.htm/news/2095199.htm>

³²<https://rg.ru/2021/10/06/recomendacii-dok.html>

On 14 January 2020, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling on the complaint of the Association of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Russia (Mormons). The CC confirmed the right of religious organisations to hold religious services in administrative buildings - both those belonging to the religious organisation and those provided to it by the owners, and confirmed the right of the owner to provide his residential premises to the religious organisation for holding religious services³³.

On 6 November 2020, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation issued a ruling on the case concerning the verification of the constitutionality of part 3 of Art. 3 of Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences and paragraph 8 of Article 8 of the Federal Law "On Freedom of Conscience" in connection with a complaint by the Word of Life Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Dolgoprudny). According to the court, religious organisations should not be held administratively liable for the absence of the full name of the organisation on the façade of a residential building belonging to a religious organisation, if services are held in a part of the residential building and not in the entire building, and if there are appropriate signs with the full name of the religious organisation inside the residential building at the entrance to the service premises. A religious organisation should also not be held liable if no religious services are held in a residential building whose address is listed in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities as the address of a religious organisation³⁴.

On 28 October 2021, a meeting of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Russia was held, at which Resolution No. 32 "On Amendments to Certain Resolutions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on Criminal Cases" was adopted. Part of the amendments is related to the partial decriminalisation of Articles 282 and 280.1 of the Criminal Code - the Supreme Court clarified what formal information needs to be taken into account and verified for the correct qualification of an act under a criminal or relevant administrative article.

Articles 280 and 280.1 of the Criminal Code were amended to include a reference that previously applied only to actions on the Internet falling under Article 282 of the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court noted that when considering such cases, courts should take into account not only the fact of posting on the network "text, images, audio or video files containing signs of calls for extremist activity or actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, incitement of enmity and hatred, humiliation of the dignity of a person or a group of persons, but also other information indicating the social danger of the act, including the direction of intent, the motive for committing the relevant acts

The Supreme Court stressed that in order to qualify under Art. 280 or 280.1 of the Criminal Code, the court must see in a person's actions a direct intent or intention to induce others to carry out extremist activities or commit acts aimed at violating the territorial integrity of Russia.

A recommendation on prosecution for involvement in the activities of organisations deemed extremist was introduced, according to which courts should establish "what specific socially dangerous actions have been committed by the perpetrator, their significance for the continuation or resumption of the activities of an organisation in respect of which a court has issued and entered into legal force a

³³http://www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID=519&ELEMENT_ID=8208

³⁴<http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision498630.pdf>

decision on liquidation or prohibition of activities in connection with extremism, as well as the motives for committing these actions.

³⁵If a religious association is recognised as an extremist organisation and its liquidation or prohibition of its activities, the actions of persons not connected with the continuation or resumption of the activities of this extremist organisation and consisting solely in the exercise of their right to freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, including through individual or joint practice of religion, worship or other religious rites and ceremonies, do not in themselves constitute an offence under article 282.2, paragraph 2.

On 9 February 2022, within the framework of a meeting of judges of courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts, Chairman of the Supreme Court Vyacheslav Lebedev stressed that religious rites and ceremonies cannot be considered extremist crimes. "Higher standards of protection of citizens' constitutional rights are ensured by the Supreme Court's clarifications that actions that do not contain signs of extremism and consist solely of the exercise of the right to freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, including through the performance of religious rites and ceremonies, do not constitute an offence," Lebedev said³⁶.

According to the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 217 persons were punished under Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences (violation of legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and religious associations) in 2020, 201 in 2021, and 105 in January-June 2022³⁷. Most were punished for issuing or distributing literature within the framework of missionary activities without indicating their official full name, or for not having a permit to conduct missionary activities (including an imam who conducted funeral rites and baby naming rites in a Sudak mosque).³⁸

One may also note the cases against *collectors of Nazi paraphernalia* (three such cases were recorded in 2021-2022) who are being tried for public display of Nazi symbols, which is clearly an overly expansive interpretation of the law³⁹.

Cases of discrimination against minorities

LGBT.

First of all, we are talking about the "gay hunting" campaign that has been going on in Chechnya with varying intensity since 2017 (the latest outbreak was in late 2018-early 2019⁴⁰). During the campaign

³⁵<http://www.supcourt.ru/documents/own/30487/>

³⁶<https://tass.ru/obschestvo/13659017>

³⁷<http://cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=6120>

³⁸https://crimean-solidarity.org/news/2020/11/11/v-sudake-za-nezakonnuyu-missionerskuyu-deyatelnost-oshtrafovalina--rublej-imama-galieva---686?fbclid=IwAR1Lcs8Z2Hkc3vzQhOg7rZXBPaHzu_GVCGP-DCR-IqQo0TDQMRobchAeDx0

³⁹<https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/zelenogradskij/services/cases/admin/details/e6f03450-4fb5-11ed-888f-79c6ab9d6524>,
<https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/zelenogradskij/services/cases/admin/details/2d881ab0-494c-11ed-b170-f77a7038203b>,
<https://www.kavkazr.com/a/kollektsionera-iz-novorossiyska-oshtrafovali-za-marku-tretjegoreyha/31455538.html>,

⁴⁰<https://www.interfax.ru/russia/646058>

dozens (if not hundreds) of people have been subjected to torture and abuse, several people are known to have been killed, and several members of the LGBT community have gone missing⁴¹ .

In June 2022, it became known that the head teacher of municipal lyceum No. 12 in Yekaterinburg was fired for "performing with LGBT-spirited" schoolchildren at a dance competition⁴² .

A man with an interest in Scottish history was detained by Rosgvardiya officers in St. Petersburg at the end of August 2022 for wearing a kilt. They were about to draw up a report on him on charges of LGBT propaganda. After a short lecture on Scottish history of the XIII-XIV centuries he was released⁴³ .

In addition, in May 2020, a group of police officers extorted money from a transgender man from Kyrgyzstan in Moscow, threatening deportation⁴⁴ .

Maxim Drozhzhin, a first-year master's student at SPbSU, was kicked out of a folklore ensemble in September 2021 for sketches in a female character⁴⁵ .

"Jehovah's Witnesses."

On 19 October 2021, in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous District, a court recovered 28500 rubles from the Russian Federation as compensation for moral harm caused to Jehovah's Witness Timofey Zhukov, who was forcibly hospitalised for a psychiatric evaluation⁴⁶ .

Muslims.

In November 2021, the deputy chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Rushan Abbyasov, suggested building mosques in places where migrants congregate, such as Moscow's Sadovod market. "New mosques are not allowed to be built in Moscow, although we proposed to build them in the districts to relieve the city centre, while the existing ones are not sufficient even for the needs of local Muslims, let alone migrants," Abbyasov said.

On 10 November 2021, Vitaly Suchkov, head of the Department of National Policy and Interregional Relations of Moscow, commented on R. Abyasov's words: "No one prohibits opening prayer rooms. To build a mosque on the territory is a whole process. In order to make a decision on the construction of a religious building, it is necessary to discuss the proposals with municipal deputies, obtain consent, hold public hearings with the participation of the district residents and, if there is a majority, then proceed further". However, on 19 November, Ildar Alyautdinov, Mufti of Moscow, chief imam of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque, proposed to open prayer rooms. Moreover, not in residential buildings, but in freestanding premises, for example, in shopping centres and in the underground. In response,

⁴¹<https://www.osce.org/odihr/407402>, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/18/german-ngo-files-legal-case-against-chechen-officials-over-anti-gay-purges>

⁴²<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5392483>

⁴³<https://theins.ru/news/254593>

⁴⁴<http://www.xgay.ru/news/rainbow/2020/12/13-43229.htm>

⁴⁵<https://www.xgayru.info/news/rainbow/2021/10/02-44727.htm>

⁴⁶<https://www.sova-center.ru/religion/news/harassment/harassment-protection/2021/11/d45271/>

the press service of the Moscow Department of Transport stated that it was impossible to allocate "premises and places for religious activities of people of any views in public transport"⁴⁷ .

On 26 October 2021, the Industrial Court of Stavropol found Magomed Salamov, Radzhab Khaamirzaev and Magomed Gitinov guilty under part 2 of article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation (organisation or holding of a public event without filing a public event notification in accordance with the established procedure) for holding a Muslim prayer meeting in the banquet hall "Sofia"⁴⁸ .

On 25 October 2021 it became known that prisoners of penal colony No. 2 in Kurgan region complained about the staff of the colony. According to the prisoners, in August the colony staff seized religious paraphernalia from them, in particular, threw the Koran on the floor and stomped on it⁴⁹ .

In November 2021, the administration of Syzran filed a lawsuit to demolish the Faizullah mosque, as it considered the mosque an unauthorised construction. On 7 February 2022 it became known that the Arbitration Court of the Samara region refused the claim⁵⁰ .

In 2020, a case was recorded in Essentuki when women were not allowed to enter the swimming pool because of the Muslim closed swimming costume - burkini. A number of conflicts can be noted in 2022 due to visits to schools or universities by Muslim women wearing headscarves. These conflicts were noted at Tyumen School No. 88 (September 2022⁵¹), Moscow School No. 2025 (September 2022⁵²), Chelyabinsk Secondary School No. 71⁵³ at School No. 8 in Balashikha near Moscow (September-October 2022⁵⁴), Astrakhan State Medical University (September 2022).⁵⁵

On 7 February 2020 in Nizhny Novgorod, representatives of law enforcement agencies conducted a document check of Muslims on the territory of the Cathedral Mosque⁵⁶ .

25 December 2020 Centre "E" conducted an inspection in at least two mosques in Mordovia - in Saransk and the village of Aksenovo⁵⁷ .

On 26 March 2021 in Moscow, police officers blocked the exit from a mosque on Basovskaya Street, keeping Muslims inside⁵⁸ .

⁴⁷<https://ria.ru/20211110/mecheti-1758370166.html>

⁴⁸<https://www.kavkazr.com/a/musuljman-iz-stavropolya-nakazali-za-penie-nashidov/31546997.html>

⁴⁹<https://ura.news/news/1052512996>

⁵⁰<https://www.idelreal.org/a/31691209.html>

⁵¹<https://72.ru/text/gorod/2022/09/02/71623211/>, <https://www.bfm.ru/news/508242>

⁵²<https://t.me/nayurru/110>

⁵³<https://islamnews.ru/news-v-chelyabinske-direktor-shkoly-dva-mesyatsa-boretsya-s-desyatiklassnitsey-vikoy-iz-za-platka>

⁵⁴<https://islamnews.ru/news-v-balashikhe-devochke-zapretili-poseshchat-shkolu-v-platke>

⁵⁵<https://www.grozny-inform.ru/news/society/143197/>

⁵⁶<https://islamnews.ru/news-musulman-nizhnego-novgoroda-oskorbil-pyatnichnyy-reyd-pravookhraniteley-video/>

⁵⁷<https://www.idelreal.org/a/31019248.html>

⁵⁸<https://islamnews.ru/news-v-mechet-moskvy-nagryanul-omon>

On 20 August 2021, near the cathedral mosque in Moscow, in Kotelniki near Moscow and in several other mosques in Moscow and the Moscow region, law enforcement officers checked the documents of Muslims who had gathered for Friday prayers. In Kotelniki alone, 140 people were taken to the police department. Russian citizens were released immediately after document checks, foreign citizens - after DNA collection. No protocols were drawn up for the detainees⁵⁹.

On 26 December 2022, in the Zheleznodorozhny District of Khabarovsk, uniformed and masked law enforcers broke into the dining room of a mosque where imams and worshippers were staying. The believers and the imam were thrown to the floor and beaten, after which they broke down the door to the prayer room and scattered books, including the Koran, and religious items. The law enforcers themselves later stated that they were conducting a document check⁶⁰.

Jews.

On 20 October 2020 it became known that prisoner Daniel Beglets faced discrimination when he wanted to observe the Sabbath as a Jewish believer. For the refusal of Fugitive and six other inmates to work on the Sabbath, the administration sicced other inmates on them⁶¹. However, when the scandal broke, the Fugitive was released on parole.

Protestants.

The Federal Penitentiary Service refused to conclude an agreement on co-operation and assistance concluded with the Russian United Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) (ROSKhVE). This decision was confirmed by courts at three instances and overturned on 16 December 2020 by the Judicial Collegium for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation⁶².

In 2020, Evangelical Baptist Christians in Krasnodar Krai were forced to hold worship services in the forest for several months because a court prohibited them from using an owned residential building. The situation was changed only after the intervention of human rights activists and members of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights. After negotiations with the administration of the municipality, the plaintiffs dropped the demand to demolish the building, while leaving the demand to prohibit the holding of religious services in the residential building⁶³.

In Ukhta, the Church of Evangelical Christians-Baptists had been seeking permission for several years to commission the building of the House of Prayer, and only on 18 March 2022 the Ukhta City Court satisfied its claim⁶⁴.

⁵⁹<https://ria.ru/20210820/mechet-1746640695.html><https://moslenta.ru/news/v-mechetyakh-moskvy-nachalis-massovye-proverki-20-08-2021.htm>

⁶⁰<https://islamnews.ru/news-musulmane-khabarovska-pozhalovalis-na-pogrom-i-izbienie-lyudmi-v-maskakh>

⁶¹<https://www.facebook.com/pchikov/posts/4609935692413172>

⁶²<https://www.cef.ru/infoblock/news/read/article/1576771>

⁶³ www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID=524&ELEMENT_ID=8296,
www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID=526&ELEMENT_ID=8298

⁶⁴<https://baptistnorth.ru/bratstvo/news/komi/sud-priznal-pravo-sobstvennosti-tserkvi-na-dom-molitvy/>

On 10 August 2022, the Vuktyl District Court upheld the claim of the prosecutor's office, which demanded to prohibit the local religious organisation "Christian Evangelical Church of the town of Vuktyl in the village of Dutovo" from providing humanitarian aid, reasoning that "the objectives of the religious organisation's activity are extremely limited, which directly follows from its special legal and social status", and therefore the church cannot provide "humanitarian and other assistance". On 6 October 2022, the judicial board of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic partially overturned the decision of the Vuktyl District Court. The court recognised as redundant the prosecutor's office's demands to remove the reference to humanitarian aid from the statute⁶⁵ .

In December 2022, it became known that the Perm authorities tried to seize the Lenin Cultural Centre building, which the former owner of the building had sold to the Perm Diocesan Administration of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) (New Covenant Church) in 2005. The authorities tried to buy the building, but the religious organisation refused to sell it. In response, Gennady Storozhev, a deputy of the Perm City Duma from the CPRF, suggested using administrative methods and cited Stalin as an example: "Apart from financial means, there are probably administrative ones as well. We can remember Joseph Stalin, who said that an individual cannot stand up to the power of the state. Why do we have a rather dubious subject opposing the power of the state?"

Earlier, the Department of Land Relations of the Perm Administration through the court recovered 11.8 million rubles from the Perm Diocesan Administration of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) for the use of other people's money for the period from 1 March 2018 to 28 February 2021. The Mayor's Office explained the claims by the fact that the plot on which the DC building is located is in public ownership⁶⁶ .

Catholics. On 17 May 2021, the Arbitration Court of the Volgo-Vyatsky District dismissed the appeal of the Catholic parish of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus against the decision of the court of previous instance to refuse to transfer the church building occupied by the regional philharmonic⁶⁷ .

On 8 August 2022, it became known that the Property Relations Committee of St. Petersburg refused to transfer the building of the former Roman Catholic Charities boys' asylum to the local branch of the Catholic Charities organisation Caritas.⁶⁸

Armenian Church. On 18 February 2022 it became known that the administration of Perm filed a lawsuit against the Armenian Church "Surb Grigor Lusavorich" demanding to vacate the land plot on Chkalova Street⁶⁹ .

⁶⁵<https://baptistnorth.ru/bratstvo/news/komi/verkhovnyy-sud-respubliki-komi-zashchitil-pravo-tserkvi-na-okazanie-gumanitarnoy-pomoshchi/>

⁶⁶<https://business--class-su.turbopages.org/business-class.su/s/news/2022/12/20/glava-permi-prokomentiroval-vykup-dk-im-lenina-u-evangelistov>

⁶⁷https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=4010090775693533&id=100000779509539

⁶⁸<https://spbndnevnik.ru/news/2022-08-08/smolnyy-otkazalsya-vozvrachat-katolikam-byvshiy-priyut-v-tsentre-peterburga>

⁶⁹<https://www.business-class.su/news/2022/02/18/administraciya-permi-cherez-sud-pytaetsya-izyat-uchastok-u-armyanskoi-cerkvi>

Pagans. On 10 September 2021, employees of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and police officers disrupted the action in memory of Udmurt scientist Albert Razin in the Oak Grove of Yoshkar-Ola, which was attended by activists of the organisation "Mari Ushem". They drew up a report on an administrative offence under Article 20.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences (violation of fire safety requirements) for Vitaly Tanakov who was performing the rite of commemoration⁷⁰.

On 4 February 2022 it became known that near the village of Tashtyp in Khakassia near sacral lands where national pagan rites are performed, a businessman, a deputy of the Tashtyp District Council. Alexander Isakov, with the support of the head of the district Alexei Dyachenko, installed a wooden statue of Christ on a metal cross, despite the protests of the residents⁷¹.

Discrimination on the basis of appearance. On 18 February 2020, it became known that at Ekaterinburg's largest market "Tagansky Ryad" in the microdistrict "7 Klyuchi", where many natives of China live, Cossack patrols "check for coronavirus" of newcomers from Asian countries⁷². On 26 June 2022 it became known that in Yekaterinburg two Tuva residents were not allowed into the club "Air" by a security guard, saying "that it was a matter of their appearance and ethnicity". The girls showed him their Russian passports, but he continued to insist that he "could not let them in 'on the grounds of racism'". After the scandal, the club manager apologised and promised that the guard would be fired⁷³.

3. society's attitude towards immigrants, foreigners, different ethnic and religious groups.

Russian society continues to be quite migrant-phobic. According to a Levada Centre poll (listed as a foreign agent) conducted in December 2021, there was a slight decrease in the share of those who believe that the Russian government should limit the inflow of labour migrants: 68% of respondents thought so (73% in August 2020). Only 11% believed that the authorities should facilitate the inflow of labour migrants. At the same time, 50 per cent of respondents believe that the work of migrants is useful for the country and society, while 45 per cent hold the opposite view. 57% of respondents thought that the presence of migrants in their city or region is excessive (in 2019 it was 63%). 59% thought that their relatives and acquaintances would be willing to do the work currently done by migrants (64% in 2019). 41% of respondents thought that most migrants live better and richer than they and their family: (in 2019 there were 44%)⁷⁴.

According to the VTsIOM poll presented on 18 November 2021, 60% of Russians believe that there are about the same number of positive and negative sides to having migrants from other countries working in Russia. 27% believe that there are more negative sides, while 11% believe that there are more positive sides. 54% support the idea of refusing to use migrant labour in construction. Only 28%

⁷⁰<https://semnasem.org/news/2021/09/13/marijskogo-nacionalnogo-aktivista-obvinili-v-narushenii-protivopozhamoj-bezopasnosti-v-lesu-vo-vremya-religioznogo-obryada>

⁷¹<https://19rusinfo.ru/obshchestvo/1740-trekhmetrovyj-krest-v-tashtype-komu-eto-nado?highlight=WyJcdTA0MzhcdTA0NDFcdTA0MzBcdTA0M2FcdTA0M2VcdTA0MzIiXQ==>,
<https://19rusinfo.ru/obshchestvo/2456-skandal-na-tashtypskoj-zemle-vyzval-3-metrovyj-krest>

⁷²<https://ria.ru/20200218/1564920345.html>

⁷³<https://pdmnews.ru/27145/>

⁷⁴<https://www.levada.ru/2022/01/24/ksenofobiya-i-migranty>

have a positive attitude to the influx of foreigners in various sectors of the economy, while 41% of citizens hold the opposite view.

More than half of Russians (56%) agree that foreign labour migrants fill the shortage of workers in low-skilled and low-paid jobs, 24% disagree, and 17% partly agree and partly disagree.

The opinion that immigrants create competition on the labour market and "take away" jobs from locals is shared by 44% of Russians, 37% disagree, and 16% partly agree and partly disagree.

About half of Russians (49%) agree with the judgement that the salaries of local residents will increase if there are no migrants on the labour market, a third (31%) disagree, and 14% partially agree and partially disagree.

57 per cent see a link between increased crime and the number of migrants from other countries, 20 per cent see no such link, and 18 per cent partly agree, partly disagree that immigrants increase crime⁷⁵.

According to the FOM poll in August 2021, 39% of Russians are sure that migrant workers bring only benefit or more benefit than harm to their city or settlement. 16% see only or mostly harm. 27% believe that there is an approximately equal balance of benefit and harm. 41% of Russians believe that migrants should be hired only for jobs that do not require qualifications. 37% are in favour of hiring them for any job where there is a shortage of personnel. Only 6% believe that migrant workers should work only in jobs that require high qualifications. 8% are against using their labour. But 31% noticed that migrants are hired for jobs that locals do not accept, another 27% emphasised that it is more profitable to hire migrants because it is more difficult for them to protect their rights, and 13% thought that migrants work better than locals⁷⁶.

According to a FOM poll published in March 2022, 53 per cent of Russians believe that the state should help Central Asian migrants adapt, while 32 per cent say it should not. If Central Asian migrants settled near them, 18 per cent of Russians would treat it well, 24 per cent would treat it badly, and 48 per cent say they would be indifferent to it. 49% of respondents said that the entry of Central Asian migrants into their city or town should be significantly restricted. Thirty-three per cent of respondents were against such restrictions. 40% said that there are many Central Asian migrants in their city or region, and 25% said that they feel dissatisfied and worried about migrants from Central Asia. In the opinion of 11 per cent, this concern has increased over the past two to three years. 29% believed that migrants do Russia more good and 30% that they do more harm. About the same number (29%) supported the view that migrants take jobs, taking jobs away from locals⁷⁷.

Interestingly, despite all the migrantophobia, Russians generally do not consider the problem of migrants to be of paramount importance. When asked in an August 2020 Levada Centre poll about their most troubling social problems, only 16% named "the influx of newcomers, migrants", which

⁷⁵<https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/trudovye-immigranty-v-rossii-vklad-polozhenie-otnoshenie>

⁷⁶<https://fom.ru/Nastroeniya/14614>

⁷⁷ <https://fom.ru/Nastroeniya/14701>

ranked 12th on the list⁷⁸. A similar figure was in the 2020 and 2022 polls of Muscovites - 15 and 18 per cent⁷⁹.

We can note an outbreak of migrant-phobic sentiments in the Moscow region. On the evening of 13 September 2021, residents of Buzhaninovo village near Moscow in Sergiev Posadsky district gathered a "people's gathering", the reason for which was the brutal murder of a 67-year-old pensioner. Participants of the "gathering" came to the hostel of OOO "Ekookna", where migrant workers live, and began to demand that all newcomers be removed from the hostel and from Buzhaninovo in general. They shouted "pack your bags", "suitcase, railway station...", "go eat mandarins". The authorities managed to calm the gathered⁸⁰.

Another outbreak of migrantophobia and Islamophobia took place in Troitsk (New Moscow) in November 2021. After a fight in a neighbouring community involving "non-Russians", a "people's gathering" (simply put, a rally) was held in the town, demanding that the police "restore order in the streets" and warning that if nothing changes, residents will create self-defence units⁸¹.

A number of statements by officials and authorities against migrants can be noted. At the end of December 2021, Alexander Bastrykin, Chairman of the Russian Investigative Committee (RIC), sent a letter to Vladimir Putin proposing to tighten migration legislation, arguing that migrants worsen the crime situation⁸².

On 9 February 2022, Duma deputy Vitaly Milonov proposed banning the children of migrants from attending Russian schools, believing that the children of foreigners should be given either to paid educational institutions or left at home⁸³.

In December 2021-March 2022, the authorities of a number of regions (Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Kaluga, Tver, Tyumen Oblasts, Perm Krai) issued decrees limiting the areas in which foreigners with patents can work⁸⁴.

On 11 February 2022, First Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, who headed the Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Security Council created to "improve migration legislation", stated the risk of criminal ethnic enclaves in Russia⁸⁵.

In the Buzhaninovo story, in September 2021, although it turned out that the murder suspects did not live in the hostel, the administration of Sergiev Posad district said it would demand the closure of the

⁷⁸<https://www.levada.ru/2020/09/10/trevozhashhie-problemy-3/>

⁷⁹ <https://www.levada.ru/2021/01/05/moskovskie-problemy/>, [HTTPS://WWW.LEVADA.RU/2022/07/05/MOSKOVSKIE-PROBLEMY-3/](https://www.levada.ru/2022/07/05/moskovskie-problemy-3/)

⁸⁰https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/09/13/zhiteli-podmoskovnogo-buzhaninovo-vyshli-na-skhod-k-obshchezhitiiu-migrantov-posle-ubiistva-v-poselke-pensionerki-sk-srazu-zhe-otchitalsia-o-zaderzhanii-podozrevaemykh-news?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=novaya&utm_campaign=v-podmoskovie-lyudi-vyshli-na-narodnyy-sho

⁸¹<https://moskvichmag.ru/gorod/posle-draki-v-novoj-moskve-v-troitske-nachali-borbu-s-podpolnoj-mechetyu/>

⁸² https://lenta.ru/news/2022/02/07/bastrykin_putin/

⁸³ <https://lenta.ru/news/2022/02/09/milonovs/>

⁸⁴<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5129898>), <https://tvernews.ru/news/279208/>, <https://www.rbc.ru/society/18/12/2021/61bdc2c69a7947d6b6f5ce8b>, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5215183>), <https://rg.ru/2022/04/11/reg-pfo/v-prikame-inostrancy-lishilis-raboty.html>).

⁸⁵<https://www.rbc.ru/politics/11/02/2022/620642419a79475d32b4fd8b>

hostel, and then the closure of the hostel was ordered by the governor of the Moscow region Andrei Vorobyov⁸⁶.

On 22 December 2022, Patriarch Kirill made a migrant-phobic statement at the annual diocesan meeting of the Diocese of Moscow, saying. "The appearance in significant numbers of carriers of other customs can seriously change the life of our people, including threatening the preservation of their spiritual foundations and traditions - as was the case, for example, in Kosovo. In this connection, many people rightly ask: what values and way of life do migrants bring? How do they treat the indigenous population of our country, the sacred things of our multicultural nation, our history and our traditions? Isn't it time to talk about the need not only to save the people quantitatively, but also to take care of preserving their identity?" - stated the patriarch.

He admits that "perhaps the economy's labour needs can partly explain the attraction of foreign nationals". At the same time, he noted, "firstly, today more and more indigenous people in our country cannot find work, and secondly, it is increasingly noted that the excess of unskilled migrants brings with it an increase in crime and conflicts not only on domestic, but also on ethnic and religious grounds, the creation of closed enclaves with a shadow economy and even an autonomous social regime, inhabited by people living in isolation and often hostile to the indigenous population. We must be blunt: in conditions where our country is subjected to incessant pressure from the outside, the above is a significant threat"⁸⁷.

4. The Covid-19 pandemic and its impact on xenophobia levels and societal radicalisation.

In 2020, after the introduction of the self-isolation regime, far-right Internet resources (as during the 2008 crisis) began to feature "scare stories" about gangs of "hungry gastarbeiters" left without work, who will allegedly start terrorising the inhabitants of Russia, and demands for mass deportations. We can also note the accusations by Protestants from the Russian Orthodox Church in 2020 that their parishioner from the Bryansk region became "patient zero" there with the coronavirus⁸⁸.

However, this did not lead to the emergence of any powerful movement or public actions, largely due to the lack of a base in the form of capable organisations. Everything was limited to a small burst of Internet activity. Interestingly, this topic was hardly mentioned in the description of criminal cases of those punished for extremism in 2020-2022 - there were only isolated references to such cases.

5. The armed conflict in Ukraine and its impact on the level of xenophobia, the country's legislation and law enforcement practices, and the activities of radical groups.

Even before the start of the SWO, according to polls, many people considered Ukraine a hostile country (35% in a Levada Centre poll in August 2020⁸⁹ 43% in November 2021⁹⁰, 21% in a VTsIOM

⁸⁶<https://www.interfax-russia.ru/center/novosti-podmoskovya/mestnye-vlasti-potrebuyut-zakrytiya-obshchezhitaya-dlya-migrantov-v-podmoskovnom-sele-gde-iz-za-ubiystva-pensionerki-proshel-stihiynny-shod-zhiteley>,
<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4986177>

⁸⁷<http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5985883.html>

⁸⁸https://newsbryansk.ru/fn_891340.html

⁸⁹<https://www.levada.ru/2020/09/16/23555/>

⁹⁰<https://www.levada.ru/2022/12/13/otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-stranam-noyabr-2022-goda/>

poll in December 2021⁹¹). As for Ukrainians, according to Levada-Centre polls in 2020-2021, 22% and 15% of respondents said they would let them into Russia only temporarily, and 19% and 17% would close their entry to Russia altogether⁹² . After the start of the SWO, the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine has seriously deteriorated - in August 2022, according to the Levada Centre, 66% considered it a hostile country⁹³ .

A number of anti-Ukrainian publications in the media can be noted. The most notable of them was an article by political scientist T. Serhiytsev "What Russia should do with Ukraine" published on the RIA Novosti website on 3 April 2022. Sergeitsev proposed "total lustration" of the top leadership and "re-education" of the population through "ideological repression (suppression) of Nazi attitudes and strict censorship: not only in the political sphere, but necessarily also in the sphere of culture and education"⁹⁴ . No less scandalous was a column published on 25 October 2022 in Argumenty i Fakty by Alexei Pavlov, Assistant Secretary of the Russian Security Council, where he claimed that since 2014 the Ukrainian authorities had "turned Ukraine from a state into a totalitarian hypersect", with "hundreds" of sects in the country. By listing various "sects" Pavlov caused a scandal by accusing the Chabad Lubavitch movement, to which the majority of Jewish communities in Russia belong, of extremism. The next day the leadership of the Jewish community reacted sharply to this material. Russia's Chief Rabbi Berl Lazar said that Pavlov's words "could have been called vulgar anti-Semitic nonsense and squeamishly passed by, but his position does not allow him to do so": "The new repetitions of old blood libels on behalf of an employee of the Russian Security Council represent a huge danger and therefore should cause an immediate and unambiguous reaction from society and the authorities of the country.

FEOR President Alexander Boroda called Pavlov's statement unacceptable and offensive ignorance and emphasised that "the broadcasting of this opinion in the media contributes to inter-confessional conflicts and real discord between people".

On 27 October the head of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev apologised to the newspaper's readers and called his assistant's words about the Hasidim erroneous: "This interpretation reflects Pavlov's personal point of view and is by no means the official position of the Security Council of the Russian Federation". He added that "appropriate work has been done with Pavlov"⁹⁵ . Pavlov was dismissed in January 2023.

We can also note anti-Semitic publications with statements that military actions are favourable to Jews. Usually the Jewishness of Ukrainian President Zelensky is mentioned, but, for example, the nationalist S. Lada-Rus (Peunova) published a post on 25 November 2022 in the LiveJournal of her organisation, the All-People's Union for the Revival of Russia (APRU), stating that the NWO is

⁹¹<https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/ukraina-i-ukraincy-bratja-vragi-ili-prosto-sosed>

⁹²<https://www.levada.ru/2022/12/13/otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-stranam-noyabr-2022-goda/>

⁹³<https://www.levada.ru/2022/12/13/otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-stranam-noyabr-2022-goda/>

⁹⁴ <https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html>

⁹⁵https://aif.ru/society/religion/chto_varyat_v_vedminom_kotle_na_ukraine_nabrali_silu_neoyazycheskie_kulty,
<https://ria.ru/20221026/ravvin-1826872071.html>,
https://aif.ru/politics/russia/nikolay_patrushev_razyasnil_situaciyu_s_opublikovannoy_v_aif_statey

beneficial to Israel and stating that Vladimir Putin is Jewish by nationality and his real surname is Shelomov⁹⁶.

The right-wing radicals proper split after the SWO began. Most of them remained neutral or supported the SWO. But no anti-Ukrainian actions followed from their side. The minority made strong statements in favour of Ukraine and tried to move to "direct action". The most notable was the story about the preparation of an assassination attempt on journalist V. Solovyov (see below). In addition, radicals claimed responsibility for the arson attacks on military recruitment centres across Russia - several dozen buildings were set on fire (but it is unclear how many arson attacks were actually committed by nationalists). Some of the radicals who travelled to Ukraine created the so-called Russian Volunteer Corps, which in March 2023 conducted an armed sortie in the Bryansk region of the Russian Federation.

6. Activities of radical groups. Right-wing radical groups and parties.

In 2021, the "Ethnic National Association" (ENO) publicly declared itself (mainly on the Internet). It promotes the ideas of national socialism and "race war". ENO has claimed responsibility for the 2019 attacks on the FSB headquarters in Moscow, murders and arson, as well as a number of other "actions", including the desecration of Holocaust memorials (only the desecration of the Holocaust memorial in Pushkin was actually confirmed). The movement itself is decentralised and anonymous. Its VKontakte account has 2.5 thousand subscribers and its Telegram channel has 6.8 thousand⁹⁷.

We can speak of a number of new local far-right organisations that have emerged in recent years. In 2020 in Bryansk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur and in Perm, the "National-Revolutionary Path of Russian Patriotism" ("NVS RP") emerged, which was defeated in 2021⁹⁸. In Astrakhan in October 2020-March 2021 there was "Astrakhan National Movement"⁹⁹. Much less is known about their ideology. In the case of the NVSRP, it was the propaganda of violence against LGBT and national minorities combined with veneration of Hitler¹⁰⁰. Nothing is known about the ideology of the Astrakhan National Movement. In form, these were cells formed by ideologically "charged" youth representatives - initially with the help of social networks.

In 2021 it became known that a cell of the international neo-Nazi terrorist group "Atomwaffen Division" was uncovered in Ulan-Ude¹⁰¹. Such a phenomenon is quite natural, as among the ultra-right there are also admirers of foreign white supremacists.- in 2021 7 people were convicted for

⁹⁶<https://meduza.io/feature/2023/03/31/svetlana-lada-rus-pyталas-probitsya-v-politiku-i-stat-prezidentom-a-esche-verila-v-reptiloidov-i-masonskiy-zagovor>

⁹⁷<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4771939>

⁹⁸<https://bryansk.sledcom.ru/news/item/1627285/>,

http://dzerjin.perm.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=press_dep&op=1&did=909

⁹⁹<https://www.idelreal.org/a/31887631.html>

¹⁰⁰ <https://oblsud-->

brj.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=doc&number=5613236&delo_id=4&new=4&text_number=1

¹⁰¹https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2021/10/29/14149513.shtml?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D&updated

praising the terrorist attack of a white racist in Christchurch, in 2022 three more were convicted for the same.

Public activity of the far-right has been suppressed in recent years. In 2021-2022, public actions, including even the Russian March on 4 November, which has become a symbol of the ultra-right, have virtually ceased. In the few cities where it did take place, literally only a few people gathered there¹⁰².

Most far-right candidates failed to succeed in the 2021 elections (even in local elections). The exception was Alexei Zhuravlev, a State Duma deputy and leader of the Rodina party, who passed with the support of United Russia.

At the same time, Russian society remains quite xenophobic. The data of the Levada Centre poll conducted in December 2021 shows a real pyramid of disliked peoples. According to it, **Roma** turned out to be the most disliked people. 3% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was 2%), 3% - among close friends (in 2020 - 2%), 6% - among neighbours (in 2020 - 4%), 3% - among work colleagues (1%). 29% were willing to see them among residents of Russia (23%). At the same time, 14% said that they would let them into Russia only temporarily (22%), and 37% said that they would not let them into Russia at all (44%). **Africans** are next. 4% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was 3%), 6% - among close friends (in 2020 - 4%), 7% - among neighbours (in 202 - 6%), 5% - among work colleagues (4%). 20% were seen among Russian residents (17%). 25 per cent said they would only let them into Russia temporarily (31 per cent), and 27 per cent said they would not let them into Russia (28 per cent).

They were followed by **Central Asians (Tajiks and Uzbeks)**. Only 4% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was 4%), 6% - among close friends (in 2020 - 4%), 7% - among neighbours (in 202 - 7%), 6% - among work colleagues (5%). 22% were willing to see them among Russian residents (20%). 25 per cent said they would only let them into Russia temporarily (33 per cent), and 26 per cent said they would not let them into Russia (26 per cent)

Chechens ranked fourth. 4% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was 4%), 6% among close friends (in 2020 - 5%), 8% among neighbours (in 2020 - 8%), 4% among work colleagues (3%). 32% were willing to see among Russian residents (31%). 15% said they would only let them into Russia temporarily (18%), and 26% said they would not let them into Russia at all (26%), ignoring the fact that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation.

As for the **Chinese**, 5% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was the same 5%), 8% - among close friends (in 2020 - 5%), 8% - among neighbours (9%), 7% - among work colleagues (7%). 21% were ready to see among residents of Russia (16%). At the same time, 23 per cent said that they would let them into Russia only temporarily (30 per cent), and 22 per cent would close their entry to Russia altogether (22 per cent).

As for **Ukrainians**, 13% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was the same 11%), 9% - among close friends (in 2020 - 7%), 10% - among neighbours (11%), 4% - among work colleagues (5%). 26% were ready to see among residents of Russia (23%). At the same time,

¹⁰²<https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2021/11/d45245/>

15 per cent said they would only let them into Russia temporarily (22 per cent), and 17 per cent would close their entry to Russia altogether (19 per cent).

Russians were least xenophobic towards **Jews**. 13% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was the same 13%), 11% - among close friends (in 2020 - 10%), 14% - among neighbours (13%), 7% - among work colleagues (7%). 27% were willing to see them among Russian residents (25%). 9% said they would let Jews into Russia only temporarily (14%), and 13% would not let them into Russia at all (13%)¹⁰³.

According to a Levada Centre poll published in February 2022, 27% of respondents agree that "a non-Russian person cannot be a true patriot of Russia", 38% of respondents agree with the statement that "Russians in Russia should have certain advantages over everyone else", 36% of respondents believe that Russians in Russia should have advantages when holding government positions. 42 per cent of respondents believe that a person's nationality should be taken into account when appointing to public positions in the Russian government¹⁰⁴,

At the same time, according to a FOM poll published in August 2021, 52 per cent of Russians believe that the fact that Russia is home to people of many nationalities is more beneficial for Russia as a whole. Among the opinions "in favour", the most popular were: "The people are becoming more united, friendlier, ties between people of different nationalities are getting stronger", "Richer, more diverse culture, more different opinions", "Each nationality brings its own, there is an introduction to different knowledge, there are more opportunities"¹⁰⁵.

We can also speak of a serious level of **homophobia** in society. According to a VTsIOM poll published on 23 July 2021, 31% believed that sexual orientation is a personal matter for everyone, but 11% believed that members of sexual minorities are dangerous people, 13% believed that homosexuality is a social disease and should be treated by society itself, and another 23% believed that members of sexual minorities are sick people who need medical help. Seventy-five per cent of respondents had a negative attitude towards same-sex marriage¹⁰⁶.

According to a Levada Centre poll published in October 2021, only 25% of Russians believed that consenting adults have the right to enter into relationships with people of the same sex, while 69% believed that they do not have such a right. 38% of Russians viewed people of homosexual orientation with disgust or fear - a figure that has risen markedly over the past 20 years (from 21% in 2003), 13% with annoyance, and 9% with caution. - wary. 32% treated people of homosexual orientation calmly and without much emotion. Only a third of Russians (33%) agreed that gays and lesbians should enjoy the same rights as other Russian citizens. 59 per cent believe that gays and lesbians should not have the same rights.¹⁰⁷ According to surveys conducted by LGBT organisations, in Ekaterinburg in

¹⁰³<https://www.levada.ru/2022/01/24/ksenofobiya-i-migranty>

¹⁰⁴<https://www.levada.ru/2022/03/11/ksenofobiya-i-natsionalizm-v-gosudarstvennoj-vlasti/>

¹⁰⁵<https://fom.ru/Nastroeniya/14616>

¹⁰⁶<https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/odnopolye-braki-tabu-ili-novaja-norm>

¹⁰⁷<https://www.levada.ru/2021/10/15/otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-lgbt-lyudyam/>

2020, 15.1% of LGBT people have heard "threats to life and health" in their address, 10% have experienced physical violence¹⁰⁸ .

Cases of racist **insults** in Russian sport can be noted. On 13 April 2021, it became known that the Control and Disciplinary Committee of the Russian Football Union punished FC Spartak for racist insults that the club's fans shouted at opposing goalkeeper Marinato Guilherme during the Spartak-Lokomotiv match on 11 April at the Lokomotiv Stadium in Moscow. The CDC fined the club 500,000 roubles and also imposed a penalty of one match without spectators conditionally with probation until the end of the season¹⁰⁹ .

On 13 April 2021, it became known that the Control and Disciplinary Committee of the Russian Football Union fined FC Zenit 200,000 rubles. The reason for bringing the club to responsibility were the stretching banners with the Celtic cross and the knight's knight, which fans unfurled on 11 April in the stands during the match "Sochi"- "Zenit" at the Sochi Olympic stadium "Fisht"¹¹⁰ .

27 Aug 2021 Khimki striker Senin Sebai was the victim of racist abuse from fans during the Russian Premier League round 6 match against Nizhny Novgorod¹¹¹ .

However, this is not only a problem for football. On 9 February 2021, YouTube channel "True Gym MMA" published a recording from the press conference of MMA and Thai boxing fighter Vyacheslav Datsik (Red Tarzan) and Cameroonian boxer Tyson Dijon. During the press conference, Datsik handed his opponent a bunch of bananas¹¹² .

On 12 May 2022 in Kaliningrad, during one of the timeouts of the volleyball match between Lokomotiv and Uralochka, coach Andrei Voronkov asked his teammate Valeria Zaitseva "Why are you catching that monkey again?". Uralochka thought he was referring to Cuban Ailama Montalvo. Lokomotiv Volleyball Club and the coach refused to apologise.

On 30 May 2022, the All-Russian Volleyball Federation (VFV) disqualified Voronkov for two years for racist remarks¹¹³ .

7. Activities of radical groups. Islamists.

Radical Islamists are widely represented in Russia. The main organisations are Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat. Less popular organisations are "Takfir wa-al Hijra" and "Nurjular". There are also adherents of "Islamic State" in Russia. Of the new Islamist organisations, one can only mention the

¹⁰⁸<https://www.xgayru.info/news/rainbow/2021/07/26-44387.htm>

¹⁰⁹<https://www.championat.com/football/news-4320963-spartak-nakazan-na-odin-match-bez-zritelej-za-rasistskie-krichalki-bolelschikov.html>

¹¹⁰<https://www.championat.com/football/news-4320955-kdk-rfs-oshrafoval-zenit-na-200-tys-rublej-za-neonacistskuyu-simvoliku-na-tribunah.html>

¹¹¹<https://www.championat.com/football/news-4440271-igrok-himok-sebai-podvergsya-rasistskim-oskorbleniyam-vo-vremya-matcha-s-nizhnim-novgorodom.html>

¹¹²<https://iz.ru/1122670/2021-02-09/v-seti-poiavilos-video-konflikta-datcika-i-dizhona-iz-za-bananov>

¹¹³<https://www.championat.com/other/news-4711003-vfv-diskvalificirovala-andreya-voronkova-na-2-goda-za-rasizm-v-adres-kubinki-iz-uralochki.html>, <https://www.championat.com/other/article-4700633-ne-izviniya-a-izdevatelstvo-lokomotiv-vypustil-zayavlenie-po-incidentu-s-trenerom-andreem-voronkovym.html>

"People's Adat Movement" that has emerged in Chechnya (included in the Federal List of Extremist Organisations in 2022), which, according to some sources, is backed by the family of ex-judge of the Chechen Supreme Court S. Yangulbayev. Its mouthpiece is the telegram channel "1ADAT". It claims to be in favour of "stopping the genocide of the Chechen people, uniting the Chechen people and de-occupation of Chechnya"¹¹⁴, but is mainly concerned with criticising Chechen head of state R. Kadyrov and his officials.

In 2020, 40 people were convicted as Islamists, 4 in 2021, and 52 in 2022.

If we talk about public manifestations of Islamism, we can note the demonstrative cutting down of a cross on one of the graves in the cemetery in the village of Aktanysh in the Aktanyshsky district of Tatarstan. - In autumn 2021 and in June 2022. At the same time, it turned out that there is an unspoken ban on the installation of Orthodox crosses in cemeteries in the district.

The relatives of the deceased were invited to the district administration in autumn 2021, where they were persuaded not to restore the cross on the grave: "They said that Aktanysh is a purely Tatar district, that here they try their best to preserve the Tatar language and the existing 'national purity'. And Galimyanova, deputy head of the district administration, said that Engel Fattakhov, head of the Aktanysh district, was also against the installation of crosses in the cemetery." The district policeman advised his relatives to rebury him elsewhere, although the cemetery itself is formally common¹¹⁵.

8. Activities of radical groups. Left-radical groups and parties.

No new notable left-radical organisations emerged during the period under review. Left-wing organisations in the Russian Federation are traditionally weak (and the formally left-wing CPRF, which is a member of parliament, is more of a "brand carrier", often speaking from quite right-wing and sometimes even ultra-right-wing positions). It is pointless to talk about any influence of the ultra-left on the population or the authorities. There is one deputy in the State Duma who does not hide his left-wing views (Oleg Shein), but it is difficult to classify him as ultra-left.

9. Hate crimes.

- Offences

In terms of xenophobic attacks, in 2020 the monitoring recorded two deaths and 33 victims, in 2021 - two deaths and 50 victims (in addition, four cases of death threats were noted), in 2022 - two deaths and 17 victims. Despite the fact that every such attack is a tragedy, it can be stated that the number of attacks is still at a low level compared to the second half of the 2000s, when the number of deaths sometimes reached up to a hundred people per year. At the same time, it should be noted that not all attacks are reported to the media. For example, the group "White City 31", which existed in Belgorod in 2019-2021, committed more than 30 racist attacks on newcomers, the media received (without linking to dates) information about only three¹¹⁶.

¹¹⁴ <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5458349>

¹¹⁵ <https://www.evening-kazan.ru/articles/v-tatarstane-na-selskom-kladbishche-spilili-pravoslavnyy-krest-a-mestnye-vlasti-posovetovali-rodstvennikam-pokoynogo-ne>, <https://aktanysh.tatarstan.ru/index.htm/news/2095199.htm>

¹¹⁶ https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/16433715?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D

Members of another group, the "United Russian National Party" from Gelendzhik, from December 2019 to March 2021 attacked passers-by who were deemed to be leading an antisocial lifestyle and members of informal subcultures, but none of their attacks were reported in the media¹¹⁷ .

The two largest cities in the country - Moscow (and the Moscow Region, which is actually a single region with it) and St. Petersburg (and the Leningrad Region) - remain the main centres where such crimes were committed. Thus. In 2020, Moscow will account for 6 victims, St. Petersburg will account for 13 victims, in 2021 - 1 victim and 25 victims and 5 victims respectively, in 2022 - 1 and 5 victims. Another notable trend in recent years is the high proportion of attacks on LGBT people, and the proportion of LGBT people among the victims of attacks. In 2020, statistics recorded one dead and 12 victims (approximately 30 per cent of all victims) from people belonging to this group, in 2021 - 20 victims (i.e. almost 40 per cent of all victims), in 2020 - 2 dead and 6 victims (almost 40 per cent of all victims).

We can mention the attempt to organise the assassination of pro-government TV presenter Vladimir Soloviev, who is Jewish by nationality, by a group of nationalists in the spring of 2022 (presumably on the orders of the Ukrainian authorities). Most of the group was arrested on 25 April. The last of the group, hiding from arrest, set arson attacks on the buildings of the police department of the Kosino-Ukhtomsky district of Moscow, as well as military enlistment offices in Shchelkovo, Pronsk, Balashikha and Yasnogorsk¹¹⁸ .

In 2021, there were a number of cases of internet and telephone harassment by xenophobic people - mostly supporters of the Men's State movement. The harassment included Natalia Eluemunor, the widow of a Nigerian student who died while rescuing a drowning girl in Zelenogradsk (July 2021)¹¹⁹ , Anna Mongait and Dozhd TV presenter Maria Borzunova (July 2021¹²⁰), feminist activist Daria Serenko, Radio Liberty journalist and FemVremya TV channel presenter Karina Merkuryeva (December 2021)¹²¹ .

In December 2021, the personal details of openly gay ticktocker Leo Velez were posted on a homophobic Telegram channel. After that, he started receiving mass calls from unknown numbers and messenger messages containing threats, insults and blackmail¹²² .

On 26 August 2021, representatives of the Men's State threatened the co-founder of the sushi delivery service YobiDoyobi over the company's advertisement with a picture of an African man. On 28 August 2021, YobiDoyobi published an apology (!) on social media for this advertisement¹²³ . Subsequently, the "Men's State" tried to "break" the Tanuki restaurant chain, demanding to remove images with rainbow symbols and photos of Africans with white women from the advertisement, as

¹¹⁷http://kraevoi.krd.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=press_dep&op=1&did=706

¹¹⁸<https://zona.media/article/2022/06/21/nswp-solovyev>

¹¹⁹<https://www.pravmir.ru/v-soczsetyah-zatravili-vdovu-studenta-iz-nigerii-on-pogib-spasaya-tonuvshuyu-devushku/>

¹²⁰<https://www.interfax.ru/russia/777687>

¹²¹ <https://zona.media/news/2021/12/03/merkuryeva>

¹²²<https://zona.media/news/2021/12/24/veles>

¹²³https://tvrain.tv/news/sushi_bar_ebidoebi_izvinilsja_za_reklamu_s_temnokozhim_muzhchinoj_posle_ugroz_muzhs_kogo_gosudarstva-536788/

well as to apologise "for imposing Western values alien to the Russian people"¹²⁴ . However, Tanuki did not give up, and the campaign died out on its own.

However, it was not only supporters of the "Men's State" who sent threats. In January 2021, Ufa artist Alyona Savelieva contacted the police after she had received threats from Bashkir nationalists on the Internet because of the publication of a series of her own drawings in which she depicted semi-nude men and women wearing items of national Bashkir clothing¹²⁵ .

On 8 May 2021, Zakhar Prilepin's guard brought a lampshade with the inscription "It could have been Shenderovich" and a letter to Viktor Shenderovich's editorial office at Ekho Moskvyy, where it was written that "under the Nazis, it is very likely that the little respected Viktor would have had to serve the Third Reich! As... some kind of product. A lampshade, for example..."¹²⁶

In 2021, there were two inter-ethnic clashes between different diasporas in Moscow. On 11-12 July 2021, a mass clash between natives of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan took place in Moscow in Kuzminki. 18-year-old Umet Kurbonov suffered a concussion and was hospitalised¹²⁷ .

In November 2021, clashes between natives of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place in Moscow. The occasion was a comment insulting the residents of Azerbaijan, which was made by a native of Armenia living in Moscow on 16 November in the air of a stream on TikTok. He was found and forced to apologise on camera. On 27 November, a video with apologies of another native of Armenia, who was found and beaten by natives of Azerbaijan, appeared again. In response, groups of Armenian youth started travelling around Moscow looking for the offenders¹²⁸ .

In addition, on the night of 4 July 2022 in the town of Kovdor, Murmansk region, there was a mass brawl between local youth and natives of the Caucasus. At least four people were injured. Eight people were detained. After the fight, large groups of young people chanting xenophobic slogans began to gather in the town, and xenophobic graffiti appeared on the establishments owned by the newcomers. The authorities stabilised the situation in the city with the help of reinforced police, Rosgvardia and traffic police¹²⁹ .

As for xenophobically motivated acts of vandalism, as in the case of attacks, an increase in 2020-2021 was followed by a decline in 2022 - 28 in 2020, 50 in 2021 and 28 in 2022. It is possible that the decline was caused by the start of the SWO - some nationalists fled the country or joined the army (depending on their attitude to the SWO). Moreover, unlike the situation with xenophobic attacks, acts of vandalism are not concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg - in 2020 they were recorded in 16 regions, in 2021 - in 22 regions, in 2022 - in 14 regions of the country. A significant place among

¹²⁴<https://daily.afisha.ru/news/54001-muzhskoe-gosudarstvo-ustroilo-onlayn-ataku-na-tanuki-izza-propagandy-lgbt/>

¹²⁵ <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4641136>

¹²⁶ <https://t.me/politobozru/5041>

¹²⁷<https://www.mk.ru/incident/2021/07/13/podrobnosti-draki-migrantov-v-kuzminkakh-policiyu-opovestili-zarane.html>

¹²⁸<https://t.me/readovkanews/23575>

¹²⁹

<https://www.rosbalt.ru/russia/2022/07/05/1965155.html>https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5447161?utm_source=yxn&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D

them was taken by incidents directed against Orthodox churches, worship crosses, etc. (6 in 2020, 5 in 2021 and 7 in 2022).

The second highest number of attacks were anti-Semitic incidents (4 in 2020, 4 in 2021 and 7 in 2022) In terms of anti-Muslim vandalism, there were 2 incidents in 2020 and 1 incident each in 2021 and 2022. Old Believer, Protestant, and Buddhist sites accounted for 1 incident each in all three years. In 2022, one incident was noted against anti-fascists. In 2020 there was one incident targeting pagans, and in 2021 there were 4 such incidents. The focus of the remaining acts of vandalism could not be ascertained.

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2020, 2,342 terrorist offences and 833 extremist offences were registered in Russia¹³⁰ . In 2021, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2,136 terrorist offences and 1,057 extremist offences¹³¹ . Thus, information about the majority of such offences was not reported in the media.

Criminal cases and court judgements.

According to the data of the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, we can talk about the growth in the number of those convicted under "anti-extremist" articles of the Criminal Code (Art. 282, 280, 280.1, 205.2, 354.1, paras. 1 and 2 148, 282.1, 282.2, 205.4, 205.5) after a temporary decline in 2019 caused by decriminalisation of Art. 282 - 602 persons in 2020, 1102 in 2021, and, taking into account that 571 persons were convicted in January-June 2022, clearly not less than 1100 persons in 2022. In addition, under Articles 20.3 and 20.31 of the CAO ("Demonstration of Nazi symbols and symbols of banned organisations" and "Incitement to hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity"), 2936 people were convicted in 2020, 4110 in 2021, and 2690 in January-June 2022. Under Article 20.29 of the Code of Administrative Offences "Dissemination of extremist materials", 1,825, 1,319 and 507 people were convicted respectively¹³² .

On 9 February 2021, Vyacheslav Lebedev, chairman of the Russian Supreme Court, stated at a nationwide seminar-conference of judges of courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts that according to his data, 575 people were convicted on "terrorist" articles in 2020, and 325 for extremist crimes¹³³ .

This means that data on most of the sentences were not reported in the media: according to information collected from open sources, 147 people were sentenced in 2020, 265 in 2021 and 226 in 2022. A high proportion of sentences involving actual deprivation of liberty should be noted - 60 in 2020, 130 in 2021 and 114 in 2022. Non-custodial sentences - suspended imprisonment, fine, restriction of freedom, correctional labour - were given to 87, 127 and 112 people respectively. Of those sentenced, a significant proportion were sentenced to short terms of imprisonment (up to 5 years) - 27, 85 and 43 persons. 8, 20 and 19 persons were sentenced to imprisonment for 5 to 10 years, 14, 17 and 35 persons to imprisonment for 10 to 15 years, and 10, 5 and 15 persons to imprisonment for

¹³⁰<https://tass.ru/obschestvo/77333511>

¹³¹<https://www.interfax.ru/russia/816105>

¹³²<http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=5671>,<http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=6120>,
<http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=7069>

¹³³<https://tass.ru/obschestvo/77333511>

15 to 20 years. Three persons in 2021, and 2 persons in 2022 were sent for compulsory treatment. The sentence for seven people in 2021 is unknown. One case in 2021 was dismissed due to the expiry of the statute of limitations.

Notable cases include the following: On 23 December 2020, the Presnensky District Court of Moscow passed a verdict in the case of anti-Semitic writers Oleg Platonov (the largest publisher of anti-Semitic literature in Russia) and Valery Yerchak, sentencing them to suspended terms of imprisonment¹³⁴.

On 9 June 2021, the Basmanny District Court of Moscow sentenced A. Berezhny for the murder of a gay man to 9 years in a strict regime colony. In November 2021, the Moscow City Court commuted the sentence to 8 years and 9 months' imprisonment¹³⁵.

On 16 December 2021, the magistrate court of Leninsky district of Yaroslavl fined the chairman of the board of the military-patriotic club "Desantnik" Andrei Palachev five thousand rubles, whose wards during the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the club took a gas-silicate block with the inscription "Death to pi...m" (homosexuals) to the stage and smashed it with a sledgehammer¹³⁶.

25 December 2021 Krasnodar's Pervomaisky District Court sentenced Zoya Malova, a 70-year-old supporter of Citizens of the USSR, to six years in prison in the case of the attempted murder of Rabbi¹³⁷.

In July 2022, the Mytishchi City Court of the Moscow region handed down sentences in connection with the notorious neo-Nazi murder of two people that took place in 2007, when a video "Execution of a Tajik and a Dag" appeared on the Internet, sentencing S. Marshakov to 17 years of strict regime and M. Aristarkhov to 16 years of strict regime.

In December 2020, six other people suspected of complicity in this murder and a number of other neo-Nazi crimes from the early 2000s were arrested as part of the investigation into the case¹³⁸.

On 28 October 2022, the 1st Eastern District Military Court passed a verdict in the case of a Vladivostok resident who was preparing to blow up a mosque. The court recognised the sentence of 16 years' imprisonment with the first 5 years to be served in prison and the rest of the sentence to be served in a strict regime penal colony¹³⁹.

In December 2022, a court in Belgorod sentenced three of the eight members of the White City 31 gang, including its leader, David Tronenko. The court sentenced David Tronenko to 12 years in prison, his brother Andrei to 3 and Poderyagin to 4¹⁴⁰.

¹³⁴<https://www.mskagency.ru/materials/3073347>

¹³⁵<https://takiedela.ru/news/2021/11/03/mosgorsud-snzil-srok/>

¹³⁶https://www.yarnews.net/news/show/accidents/60541/v_yaroslavl_gomofobnyj_skandal_s_yunymi_desantnikami_zavershilsya_shtrafom_.htm

¹³⁷<https://zona.media/news/2021/12/25/ussr>

¹³⁸<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5481761>

¹³⁹http://1vovs.hbr.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=press_dep&op=1&did=707

¹⁴⁰https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/16433715?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D

On 29 April 2021, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation reported that 16 supporters of the radical group "Maniacs. Killer Cult (M.K.U.)"¹⁴¹ .

Some sentences are surprisingly lenient. For example, on 15 October 2021, the Novomoskovsk City Court of the Tula region found an 18-year-old local resident guilty under part 2 of article 213 of the Criminal Code (hooliganism committed with the use of violence motivated by ideological hatred and enmity) and part 2 of article 119 of the Criminal Code (death threats committed with the motive of ideological hatred) and sentenced him to a fine . 119 of the Criminal Code (death threats committed on the grounds of ideological hatred) and sentenced him to a fine¹⁴² .

On 31 May 2022, the Komi Supreme Court sentenced K. Paramonov, a resident of Ukhta, the leader of the regional youth neo-Nazi association "Belaya Ukhta", who not only conducted propaganda but also carried out "direct action actions" by beating people, to a suspended term of imprisonment¹⁴³ .

The Federal List of Extremist Materials (FSEM) is expanded by 137 items in 2020, 110 items in 2021, and 81 items in 2022, reaching 5,334 items.

Religious group "Alla-Ayat", Autonomous Non-Profit Organisation "Ak Umut Charity Boarding House - "Bright Hope", Interregional Public Association "Russian Republic of Rus", International Public Movement "Arrestant Criminal Unity", Bashkir Public Organisation "Bashkort" were added to the Federal List of Extremist Organisations in 2020. , International Public Movement "Arrestant Criminal Unity", Bashkir Public Organisation "Bashkort". In 2021 - Committee "Nation and Freedom", Public Association "W.W.S." , Public Association "W.H.S." (other names - "White Hooligans Capital", "White Hooligans of Capital", "White Hardcor Cats", "SIBERIAN FRONT", "Siberian Front"), "Russian Patriotic Club-Novokuznetsk/RPK" interregional public movement "Siberian Power Union", "Council of Citizens of the USSR of the Prikubansky District of Krasnodar", in 2022 - interregional association "Men's State", informal youth association "N.O.R.D. / People's Association of Russian Movement", "People's Council of Citizens of the RSFSR USSR of the Arkhangelsk Region", "Nationalist Movement "Project Shturm", interregional public organisation "Citizens of the USSR" All-Tatar Public Centre, the unregistered public association "Nevograd", the interregional public organisation "Citizens of the USSR". The "People's Movement Adat".

In addition, in 2020, Roskomnadzor blocked more than 100,000 at websites containing extremist appeals on the initiative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and removed more than 7,500¹⁴⁴ .

10. Conclusions for the period

Further development of anti-extremist legislation can be noted, and the level of xenophobic crime is quite low compared to the "peaks" of the early 2000s and 2006-2008. Nevertheless, the level of xenophobia, primarily migrantophobia and homophobia, remains high in society.

¹⁴¹<http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm%21id%3D10439225%40fsbMessage.html>

¹⁴²https://t.me/extremism_71/1069

¹⁴³<https://www.bnkomi.ru/data/news/145634/>

¹⁴⁴<https://tass.ru/obschestvo/10824757>

11. Recommendations: – General recommendations for adjusting the legislative framework – General recommendations for executive authorities in the field of law enforcement, ensuring public safety and respect for human rights.

General Recommendations.

1. It is necessary to abandon the expansive interpretation of anti-extremist legislation that leads to the prosecution of innocent people, which discredits the very idea of combating extremism and helps real extremists to portray themselves as martyrs and innocent victims.
2. In order to reduce the high level of xenophobia among the population, it is necessary to implement large-scale awareness-raising and educational programmes to dispel various xenophobic myths, starting from school. The development of such programmes should be carried out jointly by the state and civil society.